On Temporal Authority
The news media has been humming the last couple of days with reactions to what appears to be a historic Supreme Court case about whether a religious institution can be held accountable by civil discrimination laws for firing of an employee.
The case of former teacher Cheryl Perich vs. Hosanna-Tabor Lutheran Church and School (the school, affiliated with the Lutheran Church-Missouri Synod, now functions under another name) turns on whether the “ministerial exemption” -- a decades-year-old doctrine that precludes courts from interfering in matters concerning a religious institution and its ministerial employees – can be applied. If a person is called to work in a ministerial function, is that person exempted from civil rights laws that we now accept as standard in all other walks of life?
The justices seemed stymied by the case for the time being and will not render a decision until the spring. But one section of the proceedings caught my eye:
“Justice Stephen Breyer explains that Perich violated a tenet of the Lutheran faith: that disputes are resolved in the church, not the courts. Breyer then asks Laycock [lawyer for the school] whether Perich knew she was in violation of this principle when she threatened to sue. Justice Samuel Alito says this is precisely why courts shouldn’t be looking into these types of questions. What 'Martin Luther actually said about suing the church,' Alito observes, or what constitutes 'a central tenet of Lutheranism,' are simply not inquiries courts are well-suited to perform.”
I am not an expert on the writings of Martin Luther so have not yet been able to pinpoint the location of Luther’s exact words which which Alito seems to be familiar. If Luther did write on the subject specifically, though, he is probably referring to Matthew 18:15:
However, Luther does pointedly address the nature of secular law and its intersection with the church in his essay, “Temporal Authority: To What Extent It Should Be Obeyed.”
True believers who belong to the kingdom of God, Luther writes, “need no temporal law or sword. If all the world were composed of real Christians, that is, true believers, there would be no need for or benefits from prince, king, lord, sword, or law. They would serve no purpose, since Christians have in their heart the Holy Spirit, who both teaches and makes them to do injustice to no one [and] to love everyone….Where there is nothing but the unadulterated doing of right and bearing of wrong, there is no need for any suit, litigation, court, judge, penalty, law, or sword.”
Time will tell how the Perich case is resolved and what the possibly momentous outcome is for religious institutions. Although Perich was a “called” (not simply contracted) teacher, it hardly seems that her limited theological responsibilities qualify her as a “minister” (and anyway, the LCMS does not permit women to work in a ministerial function – has anyone mentioned that yet?). She argues with considerable merit that, exempted from civil rights laws, “a religious organization…has no constitutional entitlement to become a law unto itself.
In the meantime we can: acknowledge, as did Luther, how civil laws are indeed necessary to give this world order and to restrain evil; contemplate how God’s promise to us through the Gospel is fulfilled in a community of true believers such as Luther describes (which is what we hope any church or religious institution consists of); and ask how faith-fully the parties in this very public dispute are embodying the fulfillment of God’s promise.
The justices seemed stymied by the case for the time being and will not render a decision until the spring. But one section of the proceedings caught my eye:
“Justice Stephen Breyer explains that Perich violated a tenet of the Lutheran faith: that disputes are resolved in the church, not the courts. Breyer then asks Laycock [lawyer for the school] whether Perich knew she was in violation of this principle when she threatened to sue. Justice Samuel Alito says this is precisely why courts shouldn’t be looking into these types of questions. What 'Martin Luther actually said about suing the church,' Alito observes, or what constitutes 'a central tenet of Lutheranism,' are simply not inquiries courts are well-suited to perform.”
I am not an expert on the writings of Martin Luther so have not yet been able to pinpoint the location of Luther’s exact words which which Alito seems to be familiar. If Luther did write on the subject specifically, though, he is probably referring to Matthew 18:15:
If another member of the church sins against you, go and point out the fault when the two of you are alone. If the member listens to you, you have regained that one. But if you are not listened to, take one or two others along with you, so that every word may be confirmed by the evidence of two or three witnesses. If the member refuses to listen to them, tell it to the church; and if the offender refuses to listen even to the church, let such a one be to you as a Gentile and a tax-collector.
True believers who belong to the kingdom of God, Luther writes, “need no temporal law or sword. If all the world were composed of real Christians, that is, true believers, there would be no need for or benefits from prince, king, lord, sword, or law. They would serve no purpose, since Christians have in their heart the Holy Spirit, who both teaches and makes them to do injustice to no one [and] to love everyone….Where there is nothing but the unadulterated doing of right and bearing of wrong, there is no need for any suit, litigation, court, judge, penalty, law, or sword.”
Time will tell how the Perich case is resolved and what the possibly momentous outcome is for religious institutions. Although Perich was a “called” (not simply contracted) teacher, it hardly seems that her limited theological responsibilities qualify her as a “minister” (and anyway, the LCMS does not permit women to work in a ministerial function – has anyone mentioned that yet?). She argues with considerable merit that, exempted from civil rights laws, “a religious organization…has no constitutional entitlement to become a law unto itself.
In the meantime we can: acknowledge, as did Luther, how civil laws are indeed necessary to give this world order and to restrain evil; contemplate how God’s promise to us through the Gospel is fulfilled in a community of true believers such as Luther describes (which is what we hope any church or religious institution consists of); and ask how faith-fully the parties in this very public dispute are embodying the fulfillment of God’s promise.
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